Russia is increasingly expanding and modernizing its military presence in the Arctic, while using the region to test new capabilities and challenge NATO’s ability to monitor and respond across an enormous and difficult operating environment. Canada’s geography and infrastructure constraints mean that many of its own major Arctic capabilities will take years to become fully operational. Canada needs short-term measures that can strengthen surveillance, mobility, logistics and responsiveness now, while its longer-term investments are being delivered.
The Arctic is becoming more accessible at the same time that the geopolitical environment surrounding it is becoming more dangerous. Russia has expanded its military infrastructure across the North. China, despite not being an Arctic state, has declared its ambition to become a “polar great power” and is increasing its scientific, commercial and strategic activity in the region. Meanwhile, climate change is opening new maritime routes and making previously inaccessible areas easier for foreign actors to reach. Canada’s own defence policy now identifies asserting sovereignty in the Arctic and North as its “most urgent and important task.”
The Arctic Is Becoming a Security Frontline
The most obvious threat comes from Russia. Moscow has invested heavily in Arctic military infrastructure and maintains a substantial northern military presence, including submarines, surface vessels, aircraft, bases and other capabilities. The Russian Arctic is also strategically important because it provides access to the North Atlantic and approaches to North America. Canada does not need to assume that Russia intends to invade Canadian territory to take the threat seriously. Modern competition does not begin with soldiers crossing a border. Foreign aircraft, submarines, surveillance platforms and other military or dual-use assets can operate around Canada’s approaches, gather intelligence, test Canadian responses and exploit gaps in surveillance without ever entering Canadian territory.
Russia is testing NATO in the Arctic through increased military activity and exercises designed to demonstrate its ability to operate across the region. In September 2026, Russia’s Northern Fleet conducted an exercise around the New Siberian Islands, including a simulated attempt to seize the archipelago and coordinated activity between naval forces and Arctic-based units. Earlier in 2026, Russian aircraft and naval forces conducted exercises in the Barents Sea near Norway, while NATO launched Arctic Sentry in February to strengthen its own Arctic deterrence and surveillance. These activities demonstrate how Russia can probe NATO’s readiness, particularly around the Kola Peninsula, Barents Sea and North Atlantic approaches, while testing the Alliance’s ability to monitor and respond to military activity in the High North.
Russia is also modernizing and expanding its military presence in the Arctic, while China is increasingly using research vessels and surveillance platforms to collect data in the region. Canada’s own Arctic Foreign Policy identifies increased Russian activity in Canadian air approaches and the regular deployment of Chinese dual-use research vessels as emerging security concerns. Russia possesses a structural advantage in the region: it accounts for approximately 53% of the Arctic Ocean coastline and maintains an estimated 30–40 staffed military facilities across its Arctic territory, compared with roughly eight staffed Canadian military sites in the Canadian Arctic. Moscow has also invested heavily in Arctic infrastructure, including the construction or refurbishment of hundreds of military facilities since 2014, while maintaining the Northern Fleet on the Kola Peninsula, which includes strategic and attack submarines, surface vessels and naval aviation. Russia’s advantage extends beyond combat forces, as it operates an estimated 38 active polar icebreakers. Whilst these are not military vessels, they give Russia a level of year-round Arctic mobility and logistical access far beyond Canada’s current capacity. Canada is only now beginning to close this gap, with two new Polar Icebreakers scheduled for delivery in 2030 and 2031 and $2.67 billion committed to Northern Operational Support Hubs. NATO collectively possesses considerably greater military resources than Russia and has strengthened its Arctic posture through the accession of Finland and Sweden, Arctic Sentry and new multinational forces in Finland; however, those capabilities are distributed across multiple countries and require coordination and reinforcement across enormous distances.
China presents a different but increasingly important challenge. Beijing has described itself as a “near-Arctic state” and has ambitions to become a polar great power by 2030. Chinese vessels and surveillance platforms have already attracted Canadian attention, while Russia’s increasing dependence on China has created new opportunities for Chinese involvement in the Russian Arctic. Canada’s Arctic Foreign Policy notes that Russia and China have conducted joint military activities in the High North and that Chinese and Russian aircraft and vessels have operated together in the broader approaches to the Arctic.
This matters because the Arctic is no longer simply a Canadian-Russian security problem. It is increasingly becoming part of the broader strategic competition between powers.
Canada’s Biggest Vulnerability May Be Distance
Identifying the adversary is easier than solving Canada’s actual problem. Canada possesses an enormous Arctic territory, but relatively little infrastructure with which to monitor and operate across it. Extreme weather, vast distances and limited transportation and communications infrastructure make sustained military operations exceptionally difficult. Canada’s defence policy itself acknowledges that defending the North requires a fundamentally different approach because of its enormous geography, harsh climate and limited infrastructure.
This creates a problem of military responsiveness. A Canadian Armed Forces unit can be prepared to respond to an unauthorized vessel, aircraft or other activity, but if that unit is hundreds or thousands of kilometres away, lacks appropriate vehicles, has limited information about what it is responding to, and cannot be easily resupplied, this capability is not necessarily meaningful capability. Canada has proposed investments in Arctic mobility and Northern Operational Support Hubs. The federal government is investing $2.67 billion over 20 years in a network of hubs designed to improve access, logistics and year-round military operations. But the problem is that these investments will take years to fully materialize. The current Northern Operational Support Hub program is expected to take roughly 10 to 20 years to reach full operational capability.
That timeline should concern policymakers. Canada’s Arctic security environment is changing now.
Seeing the Arctic May Be More Important Than Putting More Soldiers in It
Canada cannot wait for its long-term Arctic procurement programs in order to begin improving its position. In the short term, Ottawa can leverage NATO and U.S. surveillance, employ mobile sensors to fill coverage gaps, pre-position supplies at existing northern facilities, increase Arctic exercises with experienced NATO partners, and strengthen communications resilience. These measures would not eliminate Canada’s infrastructure and surveillance deficiencies, but they could provide a bridge between Canada’s current capabilities and the much larger investments scheduled for the late 2020s and 2030s.
Canada should accelerate the development of an integrated Arctic surveillance system. The government is already investing in Arctic over-the-horizon radar, maritime sensors, satellite capabilities and other systems, but these programs will not provide their full capabilities immediately. In the interim, Canada could deploy temporary or mobile surveillance systems to areas where coverage is weakest. It could also make greater use of commercial satellite imagery, maritime tracking data and surveillance capabilities provided by the United States and other NATO members. NATO’s Arctic Sentry and Task Force X-Arctic provide existing frameworks through which Canada can participate in multinational surveillance and experiment with networked uncrewed systems. Rather than waiting for every Canadian sensor to become operational, Ottawa could use these existing Allied and commercial capabilities to improve its Arctic picture in the short term.
Canada also must improve Arctic communications and logistical resilience in the short term. Canada’s geography means that even highly capable forces can be ineffective if they cannot communicate or be supplied reliably. While longer-term projects are being developed, Canada must strengthen existing satellite and terrestrial communications at northern military and civilian facilities and establish redundant communications arrangements with allies. Similarly, pre-positioning fuel, spare parts, winter equipment and other supplies would reduce the time required to reinforce northern locations. These relatively immediate measures could help address the logistical challenges identified by National Defence while larger Northern Operational Support Hubs are constructed.
Additionally, Canada should strengthen joint Arctic operations with NATO allies. Russia’s Arctic military presence is concentrated along its northern coastline and around the Kola Peninsula, while NATO’s Arctic capabilities are distributed among Canada, the United States, Norway, Finland, Sweden, Denmark and Iceland. Greater integration between these countries can therefore help compensate for Canada’s limited individual capacity. Exercises such as Cold Response and Arctic Sentry already provide mechanisms for this cooperation. Canada should increase its participation in exercises focused not only on conventional military operations, but also on surveillance, search and rescue, logistics, communications and the rapid reinforcement of isolated northern locations. This would allow Canada to benefit from the Arctic experience and existing capabilities of its allies without having to independently develop every capability.
Canada must make greater use of dual-use and Allied infrastructure. Building entirely new military infrastructure across the Arctic is expensive and slow. Where appropriate, Canada could improve existing civilian airfields, ports, communications networks and storage facilities so that they can support both northern communities and CAF operations. This would increase Canada’s ability to move personnel and equipment without requiring every piece of infrastructure to be exclusively military. Cooperation with the United States and Nordic allies could similarly provide access to existing bases, logistics networks, surveillance systems and training areas during exercises or periods of heightened activity.
Taken together, these measures provide both a short-term bridge and a long-term strategy. Major projects such as Arctic over-the-horizon radar, specialized maritime sensors, new icebreakers and Northern Operational Support Hubs remain necessary, but their timelines mean that Canada cannot rely exclusively on future capabilities. In the interim, greater use of existing CAF forces, mobile surveillance, allied intelligence, pre-positioned supplies, resilient communications and multinational exercises could improve Canada’s ability to monitor and operate in the Arctic while these larger investments are delivered.
