Saman Rahnavardi Azari & Masihullah Hanif
Nearly three weeks have elapsed since the conclusion of the recent 12-day Iran-Israel conflict. On June 13th, Israel initiated a significant aerial assault on Iran, targeting not only critical nuclear and military facilities but also the residences of prominent nuclear scientists, as well as key military and political figures within the Iranian government. Many of the crucial political figures close to Ali Khamenei were eliminated in these attacks. Iran responded to this initial wave of strikes with immediate force, firing missiles into Israel. Several of these missiles successfully breached Israeli air defenses, impacting both civilian and military areas.
Israel claimed that these attacks were launched with the primary objective of dismantling or at least significantly delaying Iran’s nuclear program. The Israeli government maintained its long-held conviction that Tehran is actively developing a nuclear bomb, which it views as a major existential threat. This grave concern is rooted in the Ayatollahs’ post-revolution declaration, which explicitly stated that Iran’s fundamental foreign policy objective should encompass the eradication of the State of Israel.
Iran, for its part, has consistently denied any intention of building nuclear warheads. However, Israel cites Iran’s continued enrichment of uranium to a high purity level of 60 percent as compelling evidence that its nuclear program is not solely intended for peaceful, civilian purposes. Conversely, some influential Iranian political figures contend that such high-level enrichment is not aimed at bomb production but rather serves as a crucial bargaining chip in ongoing nuclear negotiations with the United States and the wider West, in addition to acting as a vital deterrent measure against perceived Israeli aggression. On June 22nd, the United States intervened with its own targeted airstrikes on three Iranian nuclear facilities, including the Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant. This underground facility is recognized as Iran’s primary uranium enrichment center, a project into which significant national resources have been invested over time. However, U.S. intelligence assessments suggest that these attacks only succeeded in setting back Iran’s nuclear program by only a few months, with reports indicating that Iran had strategically prepared for such an attack. Days later, Iran retaliated against the U.S. attacks by striking a U.S. military base in Qatar. Notably, reliable reports suggest that Iran provided advance warning to both Qatari and U.S. forces prior to the strike, a clear signal of its intent to avoid a full-scale escalation of the conflict. This measured response suggests that the attack was primarily conducted for a domestic audience, balancing a necessary display of retaliatory force with a clear desire to prevent a broader and potentially devastating confrontation with the United States. This display of strength, which was more a demonstration than an actual assault, coupled with President Trump’s order for a ceasefire, brought about the potentially temporary end of this conflict.
Even though the fighting has stopped for now, it could easily start again, which concerns many Iranians. Inside Iran, many people feel unsafe and believe their country’s security problems are directly caused by the long-standing issues with the U.S. and Israel. They often point to the economic sanctions imposed by the U.S. and the wider West since the 1979 revolution. Furthermore, they mention the many U.S. military bases built in the countries around Iran and all the wars started by the U.S. in the region. Lastly, they bring up Israel’s constant, open threats and all the wars that it has started with its neighboring countries. They also point to Palestine and claim that all the lands in that region are being illegally occupied by Israel, and such an expansionist entity would not just stop in Palestine. Due to the mentioned conditions, they see the U.S. and Israel as aggressive actors trying to control all the countries in the Middle East. Hence, some Iranians agree with their government that building a nuclear bomb is not just an option, but something they really need. They believe that acquiring this bomb is the only way to prevent the aggressive approaches of the U.S. and Israel when it comes to their activities in the region. This analysis, however, advances an alternative perspective: that the profound difficulties endured by the Iranian people throughout the Ayatollah’s rule are fundamentally rooted in the Iranian regime’s own distinctive and often confrontational foreign policy posture.
The Iranian regime’s confrontational foreign policy, particularly its consistent anti-Western stance and regional interventions, directly contributes to the continuation of sanctions and the insecurity felt by Iranians. The regime’s pursuit of a nuclear program, its ballistic missile development, and its support for various proxy groups across the Middle East does not help its case when it comes to proving to the international community that its intention is not to one day eradicate the state of Israel. The “anti-Western” and “anti-imperialist” rhetoric, deeply rooted in post-revolution ideology, has resulted in a troubled relationship with Western nations. This historical distrust, often caused by past Western interventions in Iran, results in the creation of a foreign policy that prioritizes defiance over diplomatic accommodation. Such a stance limits Iran’s access to some of the most dynamic markets in the West and that results in hindering the nation’s economic growth and overall potential.
Even if one genuinely believes that the regime’s anti-Western rhetoric is justifiable and profoundly righteous, that its opposition to the West and Israel is noble, and that its regional objectives are entirely legitimate, it remains undeniable that it is contending with some of the most powerful and influential actors on the world stage. This deliberately places a nation in a precarious position and justifies strong criticism toward the Iranian regime. Such a foreign policy effectively traps its citizens in a perpetual cycle of hardship.
A significant portion of Iran’s population is largely uninterested in an ideological conflict with the U.S. or regional tensions; their primary desire is a peaceful existence with opportunities for a comfortable life. Instead, they are forced to endure the severe consequences of a foreign policy characterized by confrontation with global superpowers—a conflict that promises no gains or victories, only losses.
As previously noted, while ordinary citizens bear these hardships, the leadership and elites of the Iranian regime rarely experience similar repercussions. This is largely due to the fact that a substantial portion of Iran’s wealth circulates within their exclusive circles; for instance, estimates suggest that the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) controls a significant share of Iran’s economy. The current distribution of wealth benefits those at the top tiers of the regime, failing to reach the broader populace. Furthermore, private markets are severely impacted by sanctions, leaving citizens with extremely limited avenues for economic growth.
The Eastern Neighbour: Implications for Afghanistan
As of July 2025, the U.S brokered ceasefire between Iran and Israel has been upheld. If hostilities break out again between the two regional rivals, there is no guarantee that President Donald Trump can easily bring it back to a pause. In such a scenario, the middle east will once again be at risk of a wider and much longer conflict. Yet, even with the pause of the conflict, the implications are being felt by Iran’s eastern neighbor, Afghanistan.
Over the four decades of war and instability in Afghanistan, Iran has hosted waves of Afghan migrants, due not only to geographic proximity but also shared language and cultural ties. As a result, Iran hosts the largest share of Afghan refugees in the world. Yet, as we speak, Afghanistan is facing a renewed influx of returning Afghan refugees and migrants from Iran, amid a harsh crack down from the Iranian regime. During the 12-day war, the United Nations refugee agency claims that Iran deported more than 30, 000 Afghan migrants each day on the grounds of national security. This move occurred in the larger context of Iran’s 2024 plan to deport up to 2 million Afghans by March 2025. The Iranian regime revoked the bargeh sarshomari, a census slip, aimed at managing the influx of Afghan migrants after the fall of Kabul to the Taliban in August 2021. The census slip provided essential protection for more than 2 million Afghans by granting them provisional recognition and limited access to healthcare and education. Now, these Afghan migrants, including Afghan families who have lived in Iran for decades and built their lives there, are facing arrests, detention, and forced return.
Within Iran, Afghan migrants have long and often been blamed by the regime and public for the country’s economic woes and social disorder. The Iranian regime through its media affiliates have attempted to direct the Iranian public’s anger and discontent away from the regime’s failings and corruption by using Afghan migrants as scapegoats. Following the 12 day war, Iranian authorities have begun a campaign of arresting and deporting more than 114,000 Afghans on allegations that they are spies for Israel.
The high return of Afghan migrants from Iran, and other parts of the region including Pakistan and Tajikistan, are going to put unprecedented strain and pressure on the Afghan economy and institutions. Afghanistan under the Taliban has been facing a major humanitarian crisis in the form of food insecurity, crumbling health care, and restricted rights to female education and work, and an economic crisis that includes rising prices, and a major drop in purchasing power. The crises have only worsened by international funding cuts, a decrease to about $538 million from the $3.2 billion three years ago and suspended USAID by the Trump administration. The theocratic regime in Afghanistan both lacks the resources, infrastructure and the will to manage and support the return of hundreds of thousands of refugees from all sides.
Similar to the Iranian theocratic regime, the Taliban has been conducting its domestic and foreign policy against the interests of the international community, in turn sustaining the humanitarian and economic crisis in Afghanistan. To be afforded international recognition and have the Afghan Central Bank assets released is dependent upon the Taliban’s posture on female rights and its relationship with international terrorism. The regime continues its policy of gender apartheid that includes preventing Afghan girls from attending school beyond the 6th grade and preventing Afghan women from working in most occupations. Additionally, the regime continues to host and have close ties to international terrorist groups including Al- Qaeda, in contravention to the 2020 Doha Agreement.
Second, having Iran as one of its biggest trading partners, Afghanistan is reliant on it for essentials that include food, fuel, medicine and other goods. An eruption of the conflict between Iran and Israel will not only disrupt trade between the two neighbors, it will worsen the conditions of the Afghan economy. During the 12 day war, it is reported that there were observable changes in Afghan markets.
The 12 day war also raised worry among the Taliban about the security of their own regime. It was reported that the Taliban held a high-level meeting to address the various scenarios the war could bring about. Of these included the scenario in which the Islamic Republic of Iran collapses and paves way for a secular and democratic government. The implications would be high for the Taliban. Relations between the two theocracies have largely been cooperative and pragmatic. The Taliban would face more opposition if not outright hostility with a secular and democratic regime in Iran.
With the surge of Afghan migrants, especially those who escaped Taliban rule re-entering Afghanistan, the Taliban regime will face the opportunity to target and persecute those who served in the former government and its security forces or who continue to challenge their authority and policies. At the same time, the surge of returnees that include former security force members can take matters into their own hands and choose to join the anti-Taliban resistance fronts currently operating across Afghanistan. Furthermore, the Taliban may face renewed demands and protests by Afghan women for their human right to education and work. With enough pressure on all fronts, the Taliban regime may just collapse. Such a scenario opens various possibilities. These include, another devastating civil war in Afghanistan, and another cycle of mass migration to neighbouring countries, or it may force the Taliban to re-think its domestic policies and become more inclusive and tolerant to human rights concerns.
