Since the Scramble for Africa began in 1884 and continued through to the Cold War, the African continent has long been a battleground for the major powers of the world. Whether seeking resources, allies, or regional footholds, Africa is ever present in the strategies of the major global powers. In the modern day, this continues to be true. The 2014 invasion of Crimea and the 2022 invasion of Ukraine left Russia as an international pariah, heavily sanctioned and isolated save for a few similarly isolated states such as Belarus, Iran, and North Korea. Returning to their Cold War playbook, Russia turned to Africa, where a wave of anti-Western populist sentiment could be used to their advantage.
ECOWAS
Russia’s gaze settled on West Africa in particular, on the regional economic and political bloc called the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). Comprised mainly of former British and French colonies, the bloc has maintained a co-operative stance with the West, especially in the realm of counterinsurgency, hosting military missions from the United States and France. ECOWAS further has a history of spearheading international peacekeeping missions in its member states during times of political instability, mainly during the implementation of peace accords or ceasefires and to support elected heads of state. However, the advent of the 2020s saw the beginning of a series of events which put the bloc’s regional strength in doubt. A series of military coups d’état in Guinea (2021), Mali (2021), Burkina Faso (2022), and Niger (2023) saw the states suspended from ECOWAS, with the latter three opting to exit the bloc after an unrealized ultimatum from Nigeria.
ALLIANCE OF SAHEL STATES
After Niger’s coup d’état in 2023, ECOWAS issued an ultimatum to the new junta, demanding a re-instatement of the ousted civilian government. The neighbouring juntas in Mali and Burkina Faso came to Niger’s aid, creating a collective defence pact (dubbed the Alliance of Sahel States, or AES) against any external aggression. ECOWAS’ deadline came and went, further solidifying military control over the three states, and culminated with their withdrawal from ECOWAS in January 2025. The three states have also sought to go beyond collective defence, adopting a confederal structure with plans for a common currency, common market, and free movement of their citizens between them.
Despite widespread international condemnation of the juntas, the military leaders in the three countries were able to ride a wave of anti-Western (specifically anti-French) sentiment into establishing popular governments. Indeed, a poll conducted by the Friedrich Ebert Foundation found that 68% of Malians were very satisfied with the coup d’état, 27% were satisfied, and that a mere 5% of respondents did not support the new junta. These countries had previously been co-operating with the West to combat insurgents and terrorist groups operating within their borders. However, the situation in the three nations has improved little, with many feeling that security has only gotten worse. While the deposed pro-Western leaders often claimed to be proponents of democracy, many Malians, Nigeriens, and Burkinabé viewed them as little more than puppets who sought to enrich themselves and their Western backers off of Africa’s vast natural resources.
THE RUSSIAN ALTERNATIVE
Increasing anti-Western sentiments have led to Russia being viewed as an alternative international partner by many in the three West African states. Almost immediately after their respective coups d’état, the AES members began strengthening ties with Russia. Western troops were replaced with mercenaries from the Russian government-affiliated Wagner Group, which has since been rebranded as the ‘Africa Corps.’ The Africa Corps operates under the supervision of the Russian Ministry of Defence and seeks to counter the insurgencies present within the AES members. This Russian military support to the AES has been reciprocated by the three juntas in an area where Russian presence has withered: international diplomacy. Russia established a new embassy in the Burkinabé capital of Ouagadougou, while Niger and Mali have both severed diplomatic ties with Ukraine. In the United Nations, Malian, Burkinabé, and Nigerien diplomats have made efforts to denounce “Ukrainian aggression” after alleged Ukrainian support for rebels in northern Mali resulted in the death of Wagner Group mercenaries and their Malian allies.
Beyond the military and diplomatic benefits, the possibility for Russia to receive economic benefits amid an increasingly shrinking pool of international allies is a large draw to the region. Russia pledged to supply grain and agricultural expertise, which, to the juntas that rule over populations where starvation is extremely prevalent, is an attractive way to boost and maintain their already high popularity. Similarly, Russia’s ally Iran has pledged to do the same in Burkina Faso. Russia and the AES have signed agreements to co-operate in the field of technology as well. Plans to jointly launch a communications satellite and an Earth remote sensing satellite were unveiled in 2024, aimed at increasing communications and ease the process of surveying for natural resources. Rich in natural resources such as gold and uranium, the AES and Russia have further planned energy projects, such as the opening of solar and nuclear power plants. It has been purported by Ghanaian officials that the payment for the Africa Corps’ service in Burkina Faso has been in the form of granting Russia control over mines. Similarly, Russian mercenaries have been allowed to take over mines in Mali, with further plans to build a gold refinery in that country.
BEYOND THE AES
As Russia has been increasingly isolated economically and politically, the juntas of the AES have become crucial for fueling Russia’s continued war in Ukraine. Yet members of ECOWAS, especially Nigeria, who have elected civilian governments stood ready to remove these regimes. Had the West capitalized on the opportunity to provide support to ECOWAS, Russia’s African expansion might have been halted, or at least significantly reduced. Now, Russia’s image in the eyes of many Africans has only been enhanced. A 2022 Anti-French demonstration in Chad (a Western ally) saw several in the crowd waving Russian flags, with similar scenes occurring in South Africa, Ethiopia, and elsewhere. If the West wants to see an end to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, it should also be looking beyond Europe, actively working to restore its ties and goodwill with the people and nations of Africa.