Afghanistan and Pakistan have descended into unprecedented conflict. The once patron and proxy dynamic that defined ties between Pakistan’s military and the Afghan Taliban has radically changed. Since the Taliban’s return to power in August of 2021, a major source of tensions has been over the Tehrik Taliban Pakistan’s (TTP) cross-border violence in Pakistan’s Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP). Amidst these tensions are the long-running issue of the Durand Line between Afghanistan and Pakistan, and the increasing relations between India and the Taliban. The risk of a broader, deadlier conflict remains high and could engulf the wider region.
On 22 February 2026, Pakistan carried out airstrikes on alleged TTP and affiliate hideouts in Afghanistan’s Nangarhar and Paktika, following a recent spate of attacks in KP. The Taliban reported civilian casualties and retaliated with cross-border attacks into Pakistan four days later that included the use of drones. Pakistan subsequently expanded its airstrikes in the capital, Kabul, and the city of Kandahar on Taliban military installations. Pakistani Defence Minister Khawaja Asif has declared open war with Afghanistan.
The crisis traces back to 8 October 2025, when TTP militants killed 11 Pakistani soldiers in Kurram District, KP, sparking a sharp escalation. Qatar, Türkiye, and later Saudi Arabia brokered temporary ceasefires and talks, yet to no avail. Islamabad accuses the Taliban of harboring and supporting the TTP. Ironically, Pakistan also gave sanctuary and support to the Taliban (PDF) during their rise and rule in the 1990s and during their post 2001 insurgency in Afghanistan.
The Militant Landscape
Publicly, the Taliban deny hosting the TTP and other transnational terrorist groups. Yet, successive UN Monitoring Team reports, including the recent December 2025 report indicates that the TTP and its leadership operate from Afghan territory with logistical and financial support from the Taliban. A significant number of Afghan nationals are reportedly conducting suicide bombings inside Pakistan. Al-Qaeda (AQ) is also present in Afghanistan, with senior commanders residing in Kabul, and provides ideological guidance, training, and logistical support to other jihadi groups. Specifically, Al-Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent (AQIS) reportedly assists the TTP. By 2025, Pakistan experienced it’s deadliest year in a decade, with most violence by terrorist organizations.
Pakistan’s efforts to have the Taliban rein in and expel the TTP have failed. The fact of the matter is that the relationship between the TTP and the Afghan Taliban is rooted in shared ideology, wartime bonds, and tribal ties. The TTP were initially loose networks of pro-Taliban Pashtun militant (PDF) factions from Pakistan’s former Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA). They became active after the 2001 US intervention in Afghanistan and the start of the Afghan Taliban insurgency. Pakistan’s military operations in North and South Waziristan against AQ in 2002 resulted in increased militancy. In turn, Afghan Taliban leaders and AQ members who took haven in Pakistan’s FATA and adjacent areas, recruited local tribesmen and madrasa students to fight US and NATO forces in Afghanistan. In December 2007, the TTP emerged as an umbrella organization under Baitullah Mehsud of South Waziristan.
The TTP’s primary objective is to establish a Taliban-style Sharia system in Pakistan by engaging in jihad against the Pakistani Army. They previously exercised de facto control over parts of the northwest and, for the immediate future, will seek autonomy for the tribal areas and the restoration of Sharia law. Additionally, the TTP has renewed its allegiance to the Taliban’s supreme leader, Hibatullah Akhundzada, and is emboldened to seek a similar victory in Pakistan. The TTP’s history of providing the Taliban operational and logistical support, and recruits has resulted in strong wartime bonds. Hence, the Taliban are hesitant to rein in the TTP, with concerns of igniting internal rebellions amongst its own ranks. Furthermore, the Taliban fear driving the TTP to the Taliban’s adversary, the Islamic State in Khorasan Province (ISKP).
Pashtun Nationalism and the Durand Line
Taliban support for the TTP goes beyond a shared extremist and militant ideology. The Taliban share ethno-linguistic ties with the TTP as both are predominantly Pashtuns. The two organizations espouse Pashtun nationalism, which further amplifies tensions with Pakistan. The TTP arguably has aligned its objectives to fit with the political goals of Pashtun and Baluch nationalists, an effort to cement its legitimacy beyond jihadi Islamists. In the Afghan context, no Afghan government (PDF), including the Taliban, has formally recognized the international border between Afghanistan and Pakistan, the Durand Line. Pashtun nationalists in Afghanistan view the border as an illegitimate colonial border imposed on them by the British through the 1893 Durand treaty. They advocate for Pashtunistan or a greater Afghanistan by seceding Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and parts of Baluchistan.
In the mid-20th century, Afghan Prime Minister Daoud Khan, an adherent of Pashtun nationalism and advocate of Pashtunistan, supported Pashtun tribal militias in Pakistan’s tribal areas, the Northwest Frontier Province, and Baluchistan. Symbolism resurfaced in November 2025, when a map of a greater Afghanistan was presented to the Taliban Deputy Interior Minister Mohammad Nabi Omari in Khost province. The map, titled ‘Loy Afghanistan’ Pashto for Greater Afghanistan, depicts Pakistan’s Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa, Gilgit-Baltistan, and Baluchistan provinces as one with Afghanistan.
From a legal perspective, Afghanistan has historically invoked the legal doctrine of rebus sic stantibus, arguing that the 1893 Durand treaty lost validity after British India’s dissolution in 1947 and that it was signed under duress. Pakistan counters with uti possidetis, asserting that states formed after decolonization inherit the borders that existed at the time of their independence to maintain stability and prevent conflict. Furthermore, Afghan rulers reaffirmed the border in subsequent treaties with the British Raj, signed in 1905, 1919, and the 1921. After the Third Anglo-Afghan War, Afghanistan regained control over its foreign relations and was free to pursue treaties independently.
By pursuing the idea of a greater Afghanistan, the Taliban and the TTP also risk destabilizing the social fabric of the Afghan state. Afghanistan is a multiethnic state with other significant ethnic populations: the Tajik, Hazara, and Uzbek. Already, Persian speakers within Afghanistan are reportedly facing increased marginalization of Persian in favor of Pashto within government and academic institutions. In northern and central Afghanistan, Tajik, Hazara, and Uzbek communities have faced displacement and evictions over land disputes with Pashtun nomads, known as Kuchis, whom the Taliban often favor.
India-Taliban Ties
Afghanistan and Pakistan relations have also been strained over the increasing ties between the Taliban and India. The October airstrikes by Pakistan in Afghanistan coincided with the start of the Taliban’s foreign minister, Amir Khan Muttaqi’s weeklong trip to India. Muttaqi met with his Indian counterpart, External Affairs Minister Subrahmanyam Jaishankar, and the delegates discussed and affirmed trade, connectivity, cooperation on hydroelectric projects, and humanitarian support. The Taliban’s visit to India is situated in the larger context of the region’s geopolitics. Afghanistan has long been the battleground for the India-Pakistan rivalry.
During the anti-Soviet jihad of the 1980’s in Afghanistan, Pakistan’s military adopted the doctrine of strategic depth (PDF) vis-à-vis Afghanistan. To ensure it would not be facing a two-pronged confrontation from its east and west, Pakistan strongly supported Pashtun Islamist Afghan militants in the hopes that when in power, they would be hostile to India and put Pashtun nationalist policies aside in favor of pan-Islamist solidarity. When Gulbuddin Hekmatyar’s Hizb e Islami failed to achieve control over Kabul, Islamabad found a new ally in an emerging Taliban from southern Afghanistan.
After 2001, India invested in significant development assistance to Afghanistan and established a strong political and economic partnership with the governments of Hamid Karzai and Ashraf Ghani. As a result of its presence in Afghanistan, India became subject to high-level terrorist attacks by the Taliban at the behest of Pakistan. One prominent terror attack was the July 2008 India embassy bombing in Kabul, which killed 58 civilians and the Indian defense attaché.
After the Taliban victory over the government of Ashraf Ghani, Pakistan believed it had achieved its desired strategic depth. Instead, India and the Taliban have surprisingly warmed relations. On June 23, 2022, India opened a technical mission in Afghanistan for humanitarian support. Following Muttaqi’s week-long visit, India fully reopened its embassy in Kabul, and a Taliban-appointed diplomat has been posted at the Afghan embassy in New Delhi.
The Taliban and India are both pursuing a strategy of pragmatism. The Taliban is focused on building up its regional allies and partnerships amidst Western diplomatic isolation and loosening its reliance on Pakistan. India seeks to maintain influence in Afghanistan and to balance against Pakistan, while incentivizing the Taliban to restrain anti-India militants from attacking India. These shifts in relations have worried Islamabad, with Pakistan’s Defence Minister publicly accusing the Taliban of being India’s proxy against Pakistan.
In sum, the Taliban’s return to power is becoming a strategic blowback for Pakistan. The resurgence of the TTP, in conjunction with Pashtun nationalism over the Durand Line, and the evolving India-Taliban relations are converging to produce sustained conflict. Without meaningful recalibration on both sides—particularly regarding militant sanctuaries and border recognition—the Afghanistan–Pakistan relationship risks devolving into sustained confrontation, with repercussions extending across South and Central Asia.
