Saman Azari & Masihullah Hanif
Over the past 40 years, the Iranian regime developed a proxy network that allowed it to project power across the Middle East. Iran’s approach proved to be successful as the ayatollahs have been able to dictate affairs in Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, Palestine, and Yemen. Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei has called this network the ‘Axis of Resistance’ and has claimed that its existence is key in undermining the influences of the US, Israel, and Saudi Arabia. This successful record in the Middle East is facing a serious challenge due to some of the recent developments in the region. Hamas and Hezbollah have been degraded by the Israeli campaign in Gaza and Southern Lebanon. The top leaders of both groups have been eliminated, and many of their capacities have diminished. In Syria, Bashar al- Assad, one of Iran’s most important regional allies, was suddenly ousted. Furthermore, Iran’s influence in Iraq is to an extent being challenged as more Iraqis are becoming dissatisfied with Tehran’s involvement in the affairs of the state. In addition, the Shia Iraqi leadership has lately found it difficult to be on the same page as Khamenei. Other than the prospect of losing influence, these developments have concerned the ayatollahs because of the threat they pose to the endurance of the regime, as they believe that the only effective way to prevent the West from achieving regime change in Iran is to establish a strong presence beyond the borders of the country.
To delve deeper into Iran’s struggles with regard to Palestine, it is important to note the current state of Hamas. The IDF has destroyed a substantial amount of Hamas-made infrastructure in Gaza. They also claim that they have killed around 17 thousand Hamas fighters. Although there is no way of verifying the precise extent of the casualties, it is plausible to assume that many of Hamas members and leaders have been killed considering the apparent level of damage. Hamas’ reduced capacity will make it difficult for them to conduct operations against Israel from Gaza for the foreseeable future. Furthermore, it has become harder for Iran to support Hamas because the border corridor between Gaza and Egypt that Hamas uses for bringing in resources is now sealed off. Most of the tunnels that connect Gaza to Egypt have also been found by the IDF. This new situation will make it harder for Hamas to recover from their losses, and a weaker Hamas means more avenues for the Palestinian Authority (PA) to regain some of its lost influence. This prospect is detrimental to Iran’s position in that region because the PA is known for its tendency to engage in positive dialogue with Israel.
In Lebanon, Hezbollah is having a hard time reorganizing following the killings of Hassan Nasrallah and many other leadership figures of the group. The day after Hamas attacked Israel on October 7, 2023, Hezbollah forces started to engage in daily exchanges of fire with the IDF. This conflict lasted over a year, and according to the IDF, the Israeli forces were able to destroy a significant portion of Hezbollah’s arms production and storage sites. During the course of this war, Israel killed Ali Karaki, Nabil Kaouk, Ibrahim Akil, and Ahmad Wehbe, who were some of the most important leaders of this group. The final nail in the coffin was when Israel managed to eliminate Nasrallah, who was the main leader and the backbone of the Hezbollah movement. This loss has put Hezbollah in a state of shock and disarray. Hezbollah was not able to organize its forces effectively in order to continue the war with Israel, and as a result, an effort to reach a ceasefire ensued. This recent decline of Hezbollah can also be linked to the takeover of Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) in Syria. Hezbollah has essentially been cut off from that country, and that means the loss of important military positions and training grounds. Furthermore, they have lost access to a critical corridor in Syria that Iran utilizes to supply them with resources. To make matters worse for Hezbollah, the Lebanese parliament recently voted for Joseph Aoun to become the next president of Lebanon. Aoun was the army chief of the country, and he had great interest in building a stronger central army for the state. Lebanon’s army has always been overshadowed by Hezbollah’s armed forces, and Aoun believes that due to some of the recent setbacks experienced by Hezbollah, now is a great time for the state to consolidate its jurisdiction. Hezbollah is Iran’s most important proxy and their most successful revolutionary export. The decline of this group, which is located in a key strategic position in relation to Israel, will significantly decline Iran’s ability to effectively deter Israel.
Moving onto Syria, the fall of Assad dismantled Tehran’s politico-military infrastructure in Syria, and that significantly undermines Iran’s regional and national security strategy. Assad managed to survive the 2011 Syrian Revolution with the help of Iran and Russia. After the war settled down, Assad accepted Tehran’s request for Iran to maintain its bases of operation in Syria. Iran started to build more bases and eventually began to dominate most of Syria. The Assad government started to show frailty due to both Russia and Iran being occupied with their respective adversaries, Israel and Ukraine. HTS utilized this power vacuum and took over Damascus in only 14 days. HTS leader Abu Mohammed al-Julani has vowed to end Iran’s activities in Syria. This means that the $50 billion Iran invested in Syria to extend its strategic depth has gone in vain. The severity of the situation in Syria for Iran can be summarized by the blunt comments of a senior Iranian military commander, Behrouz Esbati. He stated that, “I do not consider losing Syria something to be proud of… We were defeated, and defeated very badly, we took a very big blow, and it has been very difficult.” It needs to be mentioned that this shift in power in Syria also has domestic repercussions for the Iranian regime. The ayatollahs are concerned because the rapid nature of Assad’s fall has given the people of Iran who oppose the regime, much needed hope. The opposers now say that maybe one day they could make such significant changes happen in Iran.
The case of Iraq is interesting because the Iranian proxies there have not faced the level of challenge experienced by other affiliated proxies in Yemen, Lebanon, and Syria, yet the change in tone of the Iraqi leadership towards Tehran has worried Khamenei. As a result of this concern, the Iranian state arranged a meeting between the Iraqi Prime Minister, Mohammed Shia Sudani, and Khamenei in Tehran. Khamenei told Sudani that it is important for Iraq to continue their efforts in limiting the US’ presence in the country, which Sudani agreed with. Khamenei also stated that it is crucial for the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) to become more active in the region in order to achieve added security for the people of Iraq. Sudani also agreed with that sentiment; however, he asserted that the PMF would be more effective if they were entirely administered by the Iraqi government. Khamenei is not going to appreciate Sudani’s recent posture in regards to the PMF because Sudani is essentially saying that he does not want Tehran to control the PMF any longer. The PMF is Iraq’s most capable armed forces group, and they have been Iran’s best instrument in directing the affairs of the country. Another apparent disagreement between Khamenei and Sudani has been regarding handling the new situation in Syria. Sudani believes that Iraq should stay clear of the chaos in Syria following the collapse of Assad. On the other hand, Khamenei believes that the best course of action is to find a way to make the new government in Syria a failed government. In other words, Khamenei appears to be for interventionism while the Iraqi state is in favor of neutrality. To achieve this objective, Iran is making connections with opposers of Julani and sending them resources. Khamenei believes that such an effort is justified because Julani’s takeover is illegitimate and will be rejected by most Syrians in the near future. He recently stated that Julani’s group was able to take over Syria only because of the help from the US and Israel. He is implying that Julani is controlled by the West and he would not do what is in the best interest of the Syrian people. Furthermore, he claimed that young Syrians who have nothing to lose will stand against the HTS and put an end to the chaos that will be produced by the HTS. Iran wants the help of Iraq in achieving its new goals in Syria; however, as mentioned, the Iraqi government does not want to intervene in this matter. Iraq is on the path of great development, and such a conflict could hinder all the progress they have made. Sudani is also aware that the Iraqis who live near the border of Syria are mostly Sunni and they are not content with what has transpired in Iraq since the fall of Saddam Hussein. Sudani is worried that if the relations between Syria and Iraq become hostile, the new leaders of Syria would start encouraging dissatisfied Sunni Iraqis to form rebel groups among them and take action against the government in Baghdad. This is why Sudani did what he could to prevent the PMF from going to Syria and helping Assad. He also convinced the commanders of the PMF to keep a distance from the Syrian border for the time being. Moreover, the PMF has been directed to stop its attacks against Israel in order to prevent any future response from the Israelis. What is interesting is that the PMF is doing what Sudani wants without getting the green light from Tehran first. This is unprecedented and another reason why the ayatollahs are concerned regarding Iraq.
To conclude, Iran’s proxy network has fundamentally been dismantled, at least for the short term. This foreign policy crisis is an addition to a number of domestic issues facing the Iranian regime. The major economic crisis is one of those issues, and that is about to get worse because of Trump’s maximum pressure policy. A major economic decline for Iran is going to make it harder for the regime to recover from its losses in the region. There is also a looming succession crisis. Khamenei is 85, and appears to be struggling with a number of health problems. It is not determined who his replacement is going to be. There are rumors that suggest that behind closed doors the disagreement between Khamenei and some of the members of the IRGC regarding this matter is heating up and could result in an internal strife down the line. All these issues combined could for the first time seriously challenge the durability of the Iranian regime. Nevertheless, it is important to mention that the ayatollahs have shown before that they know how to bounce back from tough situations, so it would be a mistake to assume that this is the beginning of the end when it comes to that regime and its regional adventures. However, at the moment, Iran does appear notably weak, and Khamenei could be in trouble.
